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This article describes and analyses the implementation and results of undercover operations in one
country (the Netherlands). First, we examine and analyse the main assumptions underlying ac-
ademic and legislative discourses relating both to the regulation and control of undercover opera-
tions and to the kind of results the operations may produce. Second, we analyse documentation and
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Introduction
Recent years have seen a shift from reactive to proactive policing (Roberts 2007: 99;
Maguire and John 1996: 316–18). This shift, caused by the rise of organized crime
and concerns about terrorism, has been accompanied by the use of increasingly invasive
investigative techniques.1 Examples are covert yet non-deceptive techniques such as tele-
phone tapping and electronic surveillance, but also deceptive techniques such as un-
dercover policing. Compared to other methods of criminal investigation, undercover
operations are different not only because of their covert and deceptive nature, but also
because the police participate in the very crimes they are investigating (Ross 2008: 239).
Inmany countries, the use of covert policing has been the subject of heated debate, some-
times as a result of outright (political) scandals (see section 3; see also Ross 2008: 240). The
debates usually imply that undercover policing is a controversial investigativemethod: a nec-
essary or unnecessary ‘evil’. Commonly, however, these debates lack basic empirical evi-
dence and are mainly based upon normative grounds and untested assumptions.
This article describes and analyses the implementation and results of undercover
operations in one country (the Netherlands). First, we examine and analyse the main
assumptions underlying academic and legislative discourses relating both to the regu-
lation and control of undercover operations and to the kind of results the operations
may produce. Second, we analyse documentation and interviews relating to all 89 Dutch
criminal investigations in 2004 in which undercover teams were consulted.
We will address the following research questions: How often are undercover operations
deployed?What different types of undercover operations exist? andWhat results have these
operations produced? The empirical data consist of all covert policing operations in the
Netherlands in 2004 and the available Dutch jurisprudence (over several years) regarding
undercover operations. For a further discussion of these data sources, we refer to section 4.
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In addressing these research questions, we briefly examine the history of undercover
operations in Europe and the United States (section 2) and look into the academic and
legislative debate regarding undercover operations (section 3). Furthermore, we intro-
duce our empirical data (section 4), present empirical insight into the numbers, types,
course and results of undercover operations in the Netherlands (section 5), and exam-
ine the Dutch courts’ judgments regarding the legitimacy of undercover operations
(section 6). Finally, we summarize the results and discuss the validity of the assumptions
underlying the academic and legislative debate (section 7).
Undercover Operations: A Brief History
The use of spies and informants to gather information on rivals and subjects was de-
scribed by the Romans (Gibbon 1831). However, the systematic use of undercover po-
licing became possible only with the emergence of more or less modern police
organizations (Marx 1988: 17). Such a police organization first came into being in Paris
at the end of the seventeenth century. Its goal was to protect the political order of the
city, yet it also targeted criminal matters. The notorious bureau de sureˆte´ deployed under-
cover operations on a large scale (Fijnaut and Marx 1995a: 2–3). During the eighteenth
century, the United Kingdom became acquainted with the thief takers: citizens who were
part of the underworld and who recovered stolen property for a reward. Undercover
methods were also used by what is often called London’s first professional police force,
the Bow Street Runners, set up in the mid eighteenth century by Henry Fielding. Mod-
ernization of the police system took place with the passage of the Metropolitan Police
Improvement Act, in 1829. The traditional system of parish policing was replaced by the
new police (Fijnaut and Marx 1995a: 7–8; Goddard 1957). To contrast the new police with
the broadly feared continental, ‘tyrannical’ type of policing, Home Secretary Sir Robert
Peel presented the model of policing by consent. It expressed the philosophy of preventive
policing via a uniformed presence rather than a secret police presence (Roberts 2007:
97; Fijnaut andMarx 1995a: 7–9). However, because the systemwas not effective enough,
in 1842, a team of plain-clothes detectives was formed. Threats to the political order
during the last decades of the nineteenth century, such as the Fenian bombings, led
to a expansion and specialisation of active forms of undercover policing (John and
Maguire 2007: 200; Fijnaut and Marx 1995a: 8–9).
The United States shared the British fear of a continental police system and its asso-
ciated informants and spies—a fear that was enhanced by its struggle for independence.
It lacked federal investigation services of any size until the beginning of the twentieth
century, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was formed. During the 1920s
and 1930s, the FBI used undercover operations in the fight against espionage and sab-
otage committed by Communist and fascist groups (Fijnaut and Marx 1995a: 10–14).
During roughly the same period, the political use of undercover policing steeply in-
creased in Europe as well. Yet, in post-war Europe, undercover methods were initially
discredited, as a result of the intensive use the national-socialist Third Reich and the
Communist Soviet Union had been making of government espionage against their
own populations (Marx 1988: 22–32).
An increase in the use of undercover operations by the regular police (outside the
sphere of state security) has occurred from the 1960s onwards, during a period when
organized crime, primarily centred on drug trafficking, has been growing. Because of
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the consensual nature of these crimes, reactive investigative methods are less adequate.
Reactive policing, primarily instigated by victim reports and criminal events and focused
on gathering evidence on past behaviour of offenders, is therefore increasingly replaced
by proactive policing, which aims at gathering evidence on the current and future be-
haviour of offenders. In the United States, this has resulted in the large-scale use of
undercover operations, mainly in the form of so-called buy-bust operations. These
are operations in which the police create the opportunity for someone to commit
a crime, such as by having an undercover agent pose as someone who wants to buy drugs.
As part of its war on drugs, the American Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA)
exported the use of this investigative instrument to Western Europe. Because of the ‘im-
portation’ of these operations, the use of undercover methods by the police has in-
creased in Europe as well (Ross 2008: 241; Fijnaut and Marx 1995a: 15–16).
The use of undercover operations is not limited to investigations into drug crimes. In
the United States, so-called anti-fencing sting operations are directed against property
crimes (Marx 1988: 108–28). More recently, sting operations are brought into action on
the internet, too, with American undercover agents posing as juveniles in order to catch
online sex offenders (Mitchell et al. 2005: 251–6). Undercover operations against drug
trading, just as those against fencing and online sex offenders, are usually proactive. Yet,
undercover operations are also applied in reactive criminal investigations. Since the
1990s, they have been used to elicit confessions from suspects in investigations regard-
ing, among other crimes, murder andmissing people (e.g. Maguire and John 1996: 316–
18; Choo andMellors 1995; see also Smith et al. 2009). In these ‘befriending’ operations,
an undercover agent befriends a suspect and tries to build up such a relationship with
him (or her) that the suspect confides his guilt to his ‘friend’.2
Academic and Legislative Debate: Theory and Assumptions
Academic debate
In the literature on this subject, Gary T. Marx’s (1988) Undercover: Police Surveillance in
America is still the standard work. In his exploratory study, Marx examines the different
manifestations of undercover operations, the developments in their use, and their
intended and unintended consequences. The author mostly uses interviews, literature
and documents. The full scope ofMarx’s treatment of the subject is unique. Often, other
authors only discuss a partial aspect of this investigative instrument.
Many studies focus on the deception or manipulation to which citizens caught up in
undercover operations are assumed to be exposed. These studies often pursue the issue
of entrapment in buy-bust and sting operations (Ross 2008: 242). The central question
regarding entrapment is whether such operations actually tackle real criminals, or
whether the police incite individuals to committing a crime who did not have any crim-
inal intent to begin with (e.g. Ashworth 2002; Colquitt 2004).
While deception in a buy-bust operation takes place for the purpose of catching a per-
son red-handed, in another type of operation, people are deceived in order to get them
to confess to crimes already committed. This is the case in the aforementioned befriend-
ing operations. According to some, during those operations, the safeguards applying to
the interrogation of a suspect are skirted.
2A notorious British example is the befriending operation that was deployed in the Rachel Nickell murder investigation in 1992.
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Several authors have focused on the risks that may be involved in undercover oper-
ations for undercover agents. Such risks involve, among others, a compromised integrity
(Girodo 1991) and psychological problems (e.g. Miller 2006; Macleod 1995). Ross
(2004; 2007) and Fijnaut andMarx (1995b) have approached the subject from the point
of view of the sociology of law; they describe the international differences in the field of
undercover policing.
Many studies discuss the lack of control over undercover policing, in light of secrecy,
deception and risks attached to the instrument (e.g. Den Boer 1997; Wagner 2007). A
number of authors advocate a more strict regulation (e.g. Joh 2009: 195–6; Roberts
2000: 273; Maguire and John 1996: 320–1, 332–4; Choo and Mellors 1995).
An important part of the scientific literature looks upon undercover operations from
a normative, critical point of view (Ross 2008: 240). These studies frequently problem-
atize undercover operations as a necessary evil (Fijnaut and Marx 1995a: 1; Wachtel 1992:
145; Ross 2007: 493). They often chiefly examine the assumed negative aspects of un-
dercover methods, paying less attention to the possible value of this means to criminal
investigations, thus making undercover operations seemmore of an unnecessary evil. Yet,
what do we actually know about the practice of the execution of undercover operations
and about the results they yield for criminal investigations? Not much. Little empirical
research has been done on undercover operations (Marx 1988: 108–28; Brodeur 1992:
108; Langworthy 1989: 30; Smith et al. 2009; see also Grabosky 2010: 364), though some
research has been done in the United States (Roberts 2000: 272). A number of very
specific studies have been carried out, such as on the efficacy of police anti-fencing oper-
ations (e.g. Bowers and McCullough 1982; see also Langworthy 1989). These studies
primarily focused on the output of these operations, namely the number of arrests
and convictions and the amount of recovered property. Such studies also provided
the foundation on which Marx based his discussion of the ‘intended consequences
of undercover work’ (Marx 1988: 108–28). More recently, Webster et al. (2006: 228–
9) have carried out a study into stings in the United States, the aim of which was to
prevent the spread of firearms from the legal arms trade into the underworld. Further-
more, Mitchell et al. (2005: 251–6) have studied undercover operations in which Amer-
ican undercover agents posed as minors in chat sessions on the internet, in order to
trace potential sex offenders (see also Fulda 2002). Thus, some studies provide infor-
mation on the results of specific types of sting operations. Yet, almost no research exists
that deals with the practice and results of undercover operations as an investigative in-
strument in general.3
Legislative debate
Legislation and guidelines regarding police powers are the most formal and direct
means used to control police activities. Incidents and specific criminal cases play
a key role in the development of regulation concerning police powers. In the United
Kingdom, for example, the ideology of policing by consent was accompanied by a com-
mon law tradition of implicit police powers, namely police activity required no explicit
legal authorization. Although this tradition still stands, policing methods are increas-
ingly subjected to formal statutory regulation (Roberts 2007: 97). The judgment of
3Such research has been done once in the Netherlands (Kruissink et al. 1999).
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the European Court of Human Rights in Malone v. United Kingdom (1985) led to the
Interception of Communications Act 1985. Another case that played a significant role
in the regulation of police powers is the case of Khan.4 In this case, the police mounted
monitoring equipment to the outside wall of a house. The House of Lords criticized the
lack of any legislation for such an invasive investigative method. Khan was one of the
motivating factors behind the Police Act 1997. The most important statute today is
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, which also regulates covert po-
licing methods.
In the United States, the Abdul Scam (ABSCAM), which ran in the late 1970s, led to
a controversy. In this operation, undercover agents, dressed as rich Arabs, approached
members of Congress and offered them money in return for political favours. ABSCAM
resulted in several convictions, but the use of this technique was criticized as well. In the
aftermath of this operation, the Department of Justice issued The Attorney General
Guidelines for FBI Undercover Operations (Gershman 1982: 1585–6).
In continental European jurisdictions, the exercise of police powers requires a formal
basis in the national police law or code of criminal procedure (Roberts 2007: 96). How-
ever, until 2000, the Dutch code of criminal procedure lacked specific sections that cov-
ered intrusive investigative techniques such as undercover policing and surveillance.
This legal vacuum was at the basis of the IRT affair, which defined the course of the
Dutch legislative debate. In response to growing concerns about organized crime in
the 1990s, interregional investigation squads (IRTs) were established. The sudden dis-
mantling of the Amsterdam–Utrecht IRT in 1993 and internal disputes within the police
resulted in a parliamentary inquiry committee. The IRTs had deployed new investigative
methods and the committee concluded that some of them were unacceptable. Several
tons of drugs had been imported under the supervision of the police, in the hope that
particular informers wouldmove to the top of criminal organizations. It was questioned,
however, whether the authorities were running the informers or vice versa. Further-
more, the committee made a thorough inquiry into several criminal investigation meth-
ods, including undercover operations. Some of the major conclusions were that there
was a legal vacuum concerning criminal investigation methods and that the command
and control of criminal investigations should be improved. The report of the committee
led to the Act on Special Investigative Police Powers (BOB Act). The BOB Act, effective
as from 2000, regulated several investigative powers, enhanced central authority in crim-
inal investigations, and required accountability at trial for the deployment of the inves-
tigative powers (Kleemans 2007: 164–5).
In regulating undercover operations, Parliament opted for a threefold division in
powers in the BOB Act: systematic intelligence gathering; the purchase of illegal goods
or substances or the rendering of illegal services (undercover buys); and infiltration.
The deployment of infiltration is assumed to be more risky than the deployment of
an undercover buy, which, in turn, is assumed to be more risky than systematic intelli-
gence gathering. The underlying idea is that during systematic intelligence gathering,
the undercover agent ‘just’ collects information; he is not committing any crimes, as he
would be when purchasing illegal goods or substances, nor is he taking part in any crim-
inal organization, as is the case with infiltration. The requirements for the deployment
4R. v. Khan (1996) 3 All ER 289.
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of the undercover powers differ correspondingly. Infiltration is only allowed in inves-
tigations that target the most severe crimes (proportionality), whereby other investiga-
tive methods are ineffective (subsidiarity), and only after authorisation from the highest
level within the Public Prosecution Service (the Council of Procurators General). By
contrast, the other two undercover powers (undercover buys and systematic intelligence
gathering) may be deployed against a (much) broader category of crimes, without an
exhaustive exploration of alternative methods of investigation, and without authorisa-
tion of the Council of Procurators General.
Next to legislation and guidelines regarding police powers, the police administration,
or, more precisely, the management of policing, is a second relevant factor where the
control of police activities is concerned. This factor, too, has been the subject of impor-
tant changes. Pollitt (1993), among others, has described the rise in most Western de-
mocracies of managerialism in the public sector. This New Public Management depicts
the provision of various public services as a production process that can be run accord-
ing to a uniform set of business principles. To this end, policy makers import manage-
ment techniques from the private sector into the public sector. This paradigm has also
permeated the criminal investigation services (Cockcroft and Beattie 2009; Butterfield
et al. 2005). A more businesslike-run police force is assumed to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of criminal investigations. Performance management has become an
important concept. In 2003, the Dutch government has drawn up performance con-
tracts, wherein it has been laid down which ‘production’ the police force has to deliver.
As a result of this, the fieldwork of both the Public Prosecution Service and the police has
been increasingly subjugated to conditions regarding the deployment of their means,
their accountability and results to be achieved. Preferably, it should be clear from the
start of an investigation that results will be attained within an appointed period of time.
In addition, periodically, account should be given in order to determine whether and
how the investigation should proceed, based on the progress made so far. In this way, the
importance of manageability has increased, with greater emphasis on measurable
results, such as the number of arrested individuals or prosecutions (Ross 2007: 520–1).
Assumptions in Academic and Legislative Debate
In this article, we focus upon four assumptions from academic and legislative debate.
The first assumption relates to the control of the course that undercover operations will
take. An important underlying idea, or fear, is that the police, through deception, exert
a manipulative influence on citizens while executing undercover operations. The as-
sumption seems to be that the actual execution of an undercover operation, namely
the interaction between undercover agent and subject, is completely determined by
the undercover agent: ‘the undercover agent leads the subject into a trap.’ Thus, in
the contact between both actors, a mainly active, directive role is attributed to the agent,
while a more passively following part is attributed to the subject.
Second, in the existing literature, the results of undercover operations are discussed
almost exclusively in terms of arrests, seizures and convictions.5 Almost no attention is
paid to other possible yields. These are, for instance, the possible insight an undercover
5Sometimes, the possibly deterrent, preventive effect of undercover operations is discussed as well.
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operation may provide into the composition and mode of operation of a criminal or-
ganization, or the evidence that someone has been under suspicion by mistake. The
assumption entertained here is that undercover operations can only lead to proving
someone’s guilt. Hence, criminal investigation seems to be represented as a linear pro-
cess, leading from suspicion to conviction.
The third assumption is the legislator’s supposition that undercover operations can be
clearly distinguished—such as in the Dutch BOB Act—into three different types of oper-
ations, and that growing risks are attached to them.
The fourth assumption relates to performance management. It is the assumption that
drawing up performance contracts and management focused on output constitute
a good way to improve the achievements of criminal investigation.
After presenting our empirical results in the next sections, we will confront our results
with these four assumptions in the final section and discuss their validity.
Current Study
The empirical data we use in this article consist of two sources.6 In the Netherlands, most
undercover operations are carried out by specialized undercover units. When a public
prosecutor, who, under Dutch law, has the authority over a criminal investigation, con-
siders the use of an undercover operation, he usually contacts the undercover unit. Our
first data source covers all 89 Dutch criminal investigations in 2004 in which these spe-
cialized teams were consulted. This data source is unique, since information on under-
cover operations is generally not available to researchers, let alone to the broader public.
The 89 operations include all 34 undercover operations that were deployed by those
teams and all 55 undercover operations that were only considered as a possible method
of investigation.7, 8 For every (deployed) undercover operation, we gathered informa-
tion from the archives of the undercover unit and we interviewed the public prosecutor
and/or the detective who was in charge of the criminal investigation. This produced
insight into the sort of criminal investigations in which undercover operations are used,
the length and intensity of these operations, their course and their results.9 Information
regarding undercover operations that were considered but not actually carried out was
also derived from the archives of the undercover units. This information mainly con-
cerned the reason why the operation was not deployed.
The second data source consists of documents relating to judicial reasoning regarding
the legitimacy of undercover operations. In the Netherlands, judicial sentences are
stored in a public data base.10 In total, we have looked at the relevant documentary
6For more elaborate information, see Kruisbergen and De Jong (2010).
7In 52 criminal investigations, the decision was made not to make use of an undercover operation, while in three cases, a planned
undercover operation was not actually deployed (see Figure 1).
8As mentioned before, the Dutch law distinguishes between three kinds of undercover powers. In 2004, all undercover operations
consisted of the undercover powers of systematic intelligence gathering and/or undercover buys. In 2004, infiltration was not used.
For cases in which infiltration was used, we gathered information over a longer period of time, from 2000 to 2005. During those six
years, infiltration was deployed in 14 cases. In this article, we only use the 2004 data.
9In order to guarantee anonymity, examples of undercover operations that we present in this article are generalized and lack
concrete details.
10Only a very small part of all sentences is entered into the database. We searched this database for the period 2000–August 2007
and expanded our results with rulings before and after this period that were brought to our attention by members of the Public
Prosecution Service or the literature.
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evidence relating to judicial reasoning in more than 60 cases that involved an under-
cover operation and in which a judge has passed judgment on the legitimacy of covert
policing as an investigative instrument.
Undercover Operations in the Netherlands: Numbers, Types, Course and Results
Numbers
The archives of the undercover units show that, in 2004, the deployment of an under-
cover operation was considered in 89 criminal investigations (see Figure 1). In 52 cases,
it was eventually decided that the use of this method was not possible or unnecessary.
One reason was the lack of sufficient information on the suspect and his entourage,
which made it impracticable to come up with an adequate approach plan. Another rea-
son was the presence of factors that impeded the safe deployment of an undercover
operation, such as a mentally unstable and therefore unpredictable suspect. In other
cases, an undercover operation turned out to have become unnecessary because the
aims of the investigation had already been attained by other means, such as through
an unexpected tip-off from the underworld.
Thus, in 37 cases, it was decided to set up an undercover operation. In three of these
cases, however, the operation was abandoned even before the start. This happened, for
example, in an investigation into firearms trafficking. In this investigation, observations
and telephone taps made clear where the weapons were stored, which resulted in the
Decision to deploy  
undercover operation:  37 
Decision not to deploy  
undercover operation:  52 
Deployment of  
undercover operation  
is considered:  89 
Undercover operation is  
implemented:  34 
Undercover operation is  
not implemented:  3 
Undercover agent makes  
no contact with target:  3 
Undercover agent makes  
contact with target:  31 
Undercover operation delivers no  
contribution to investigation and/or  
trial:  22 
Undercover operation delivers contribution to  
investigation and/or trial:  12 
- evidence used for conviction of  
suspect (inclusion):  7 
- exclusion suspect:  4 
- steering information:  1 
FIG. 1 Implementation and results of undercover operations in the Netherlands, 2004.
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arrest of the suspect and seizure of the firearms. Ultimately, 34 undercover operations
have actually been carried out. We may conclude that undercover operations are not
used very often in the Netherlands. This becomes even more clear when we compare
it to the use of telephone taps: in 2008, 26,425 Dutch telephone numbers have been
tapped.11
Types
In criminal investigation, we discern three types of undercover operation, which largely
correspond with the three different undercover powers distinguished by Dutch legisla-
tion. The first category of undercover operations consists of cases involving systematic
intelligence gathering: an undercover agent tries to gather information on the involve-
ment of a suspect in, for instance, a seriously violent crime or sexual exploitation. An
example of this is a case in which an undercover agent tried to find out, by befriending
the suspect, whether the suspicion was correct that a man has been involved in amurder.
The second category of operations usually focuses on the trading of stolen property,
drugs or weapons. During these undercover buys, the idea is that the undercover agent
purchases such goods from a suspect to obtain direct proof that the suspect is indeed
involved in these crimes. Several times, the cause for these cases has been that the police
got notified of illegal or stolen goods being on offer on the internet. During the ensuing
operation, an undercover agent then responded to the offer and tried to buy the goods
concerned.
In the third category of operations, undercover buys are part of the undercover op-
eration as well. The difference with the second category is that the undercover operation
does not target individual suspects, but criminal organizations and, to a large extent, the
large-scale drug or firearms trade. Furthermore, apart from the gathering of direct ev-
idence, the aim of these operations is to gain insight into the composition and mode of
operation of the criminal organization. Usually, these operations involve infiltration.
The different types of operation vary greatly with regard to their duration, intensity
and the sort of contact between the undercover agent and the subject. Some undercover
operations only take a day and consist of no more than a brief business contact with
a suspect. One example is a case in which the police intercepted a drugs parcel sent
by post; an undercover agent then posed as the postman delivering the parcel in order
to arrest the recipient. An undercover operationmay also last more than a year, however,
and may encompass many meetings between undercover agent and suspect. In general,
the application of systematic intelligence gathering and infiltration requires a longer
period of time and more intensity than when an undercover buy is applied.
Between the different types of operation, the nature of the contacts varies as well. The
contacts may be purely businesslike, such as in many investigations targeting drugs or
weapons (undercover buys and infiltration). Yet, in cases in which an undercover agent
befriends a suspect in order to get information about his involvement in a seriously vi-
olent crime (systematic intelligence gathering), as in themurder case mentioned above,
the undercover agent sometimes has to establish a quite intensive personal and
11Telephone tapping is the only method of investigation for which information on its use is available to the public.
KRUISBERGEN ET AL.
402
emotional bond with the suspect. It is clear that this requires a very different ‘invest-
ment’ on the part of the undercover agent.
Measuring success and failure
What defines a successful undercover operation? Particularly with regard to operations
that are not directed at specific suspects, but rather focus on a category of persons—so-
called fishing expeditions or honey pot operations—it can be hard to determine indi-
cators of success. Examples of these unfocused operations are the afore-mentioned anti-
fencing stings in the United States. Yet, honey pots are also used to detect crimes such as
corruption among politicians and civil servants. How many thieves must be caught or
how many stolen goods must be seized during such an operation for it to be ranked as
a success? And when a politician does not take the ‘bait’ of a corrupting offer posed to
him by an undercover agent, does this mean that the operation has failed or that the
official has been deterred by earlier undercover operations, or that he never intended to
commit a crime in the first place (Marx 1988: 108–9)?
All Dutch undercover operations we studied were focused; specific targets (suspects)
were identified in advance. According to Marx (1988: 108–9), the assessment of success
for these kinds of operations is much simpler. And, indeed, when a sting operation is
targeted at a single suspected drug trafficker, for example, and the suspect sells drugs to
an undercover agent, resulting in the arrest of the suspect, assessing the success of the
operation might seem straightforward.
However, not all targeted undercover operations are that simple, and even in the given
example, one might argue about what indicates its success. Should we take the direct
result into consideration, namely the successful undercover buy and possibly an arrest,
or is the eventual conviction the only result that matters? And does it suffice solely to
measure the success of an undercover operation by arrests and convictions?
In our study, we determined the success of an undercover operation by assessing the
contribution an operation has made to the investigation and/or trial. To this end, we
make a distinction between three kinds of contribution. The first of these is inclusion,
whichmeans that the undercover operation has generated evidence that is subsequently
used to get a suspect convicted. In the literature on undercover operations, the pre-
sented indicators of success of an operation often only consist of convictions, arrests
and seizures. However, undercover operations can produce other types of results as well.
They can, for instance, yield the insight that a suspicion is probably untrue. A second
kind of contribution is, therefore, exclusion. Third, there are operations that neither
directly result in convictions nor lead to exclusion, but that do yield information that
is useful for a criminal investigation in a more indirect manner. An example of this is
information about the means of communication or the smuggling methods used by
suspects. We call this kind of contribution steering information.
Figure 1 shows the implementation and results of Dutch undercover operations in
2004. An undercover operation was set up in 34 cases. What were the results of these
operations? In 12 cases, the undercover operation has contributed to the investigation
and/or trial. This means that the undercover operations did not make any contribution
in the remaining 22 cases.
In seven cases, the operation yielded evidence that was used to convict the suspect(s).
One example was an undercover operation set up when stolen goods worth hundreds of
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thousands of Euros were put on offer in bulk on the internet. An undercover agent
succeeded in buying these goods. This undercover buy was then used to convict the
suspect and also led, through the apprehension of the receiver, to the arrest of the thief.
Another example is a protracted undercover operation targeting illegal arms trade. The
undercover agent managed to identify the suspect who, until then, had been unknown.
He built up a contact with this man successfully and eventually bought a consignment of
weapons from him. This undercover buy, too, played an important part in the suspect’s
conviction.
In four cases, a suspect could be excluded from the investigation based on the results
of the undercover operation. Exclusion is a valuable result, because it enables the inves-
tigators to focus on other suspects or to abandon the investigation altogether. In one of
these four cases, an undercover agent was put into action against a person suspected of
being involved in a murder. The undercover agent befriended the suspect and gained
his trust—the suspect stated in an intercepted telephone call that the undercover agent
was one of only two persons he could trust. This strong bond and the candour with which
the suspect confided in his ‘friend’ enabled the investigation team at one point to con-
clude that their suspicions against this man were probably incorrect. In another case, an
investigation was started as a result of information that at a certain ‘location’, drugs were
being traded and girls were being sexually exploited. After visits of an undercover agent
to this location, it became clear that the initial information was not correct.
In one case, the undercover operation did not lead to evidence or exclusion, but
‘only’ generated steering information. In this investigation, the undercover operation
provided a picture of the composition of the criminal organization, and of the means of
transportation this organization used for its drug trafficking. A planned undercover buy,
however, could not be effected.
Twenty-two of the 34 executed undercover operations have ended without generating
results. In three of these cases, the investigators failed to come into contact with the
target. In one such case, the team initially deemed the possibilities to make contact with
the target to be favourable. Yet, suddenly, the catering establishments in which these
contacts were planned to take place were no longer frequented by the target, among
other reasons because he (the target) was refused admittance. In 19 cases, the under-
cover agent did actually succeed in establishing contact with the (initial) target, yet, in
the end, the operations still failed to contribute to the investigation or trial concerned.
There are various backgrounds to these failures. Sometimes, the undercover agent’s
assignment is to make contact, through the initial target, with the person who is the
actual subject of the investigation, the main suspect. This plan can fall through because
the assumed relation between the initial target and the actual subject no longer exists or
has never existed. In the majority of the unsuccessful cases, however, contact between
the undercover agent and the subject of the investigation has been established, but the
meetings and conversations held and the observations made by the undercover agent
failed to generate the decisive information needed to either confirm or negate a suspi-
cion. In one investigation into terrorism, an undercover agent maintained fairly good
relations with the suspect concerned, but the suspect did not talk about relevant topics
during their meetings. Operations involving undercover buys also regularly fail to yield
results.
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The unpredictable criminal environment
The most remarkable characteristic of undercover operations we have studied is the
unpredictability of how the meetings between the undercover agent and the suspect,
and thus the entire operation, will work out. We have already mentioned the case in
which an undercover agent could not establish contact with a suspect because the latter
unexpectedly failed to show up in the establishments where the contact was meant to
take place. Yet, unpredictability manifests itself most strongly during the phase in which
contact has already been established and mainly during operations involving under-
cover buys, such as in many investigations into the drug trade, the illegal arms trade
or the traffic in stolen goods. The unpredictability of those operations is caused to a large
extent by the dangers of criminal entrepreneurship.
In undercover operations set up to combat profit-motivated crime, such as the drug
trade, an undercover agent, in order to gather evidence against a suspect, often poses as
a criminal entrepreneur. He uses the cover of a drug dealer, for instance, who is inter-
ested in buying drugs. Because the undercover agent plays the role of fellow criminal,
operating on the criminal market, the risks involved in criminal entrepreneurship apply
to him, too—a hazard that also looms over the success of the undercover operation.
There are three types of risk attached to criminal entrepreneurship (cf. Reuter 1983:
113–17). First, the environment in which criminal entrepreneurs operate is unregu-
lated. There are no formal procedures to revert to, such as regarding drafting a contract,
there is no mediating, judging authority that offers a solution when a disagreement
occurs, and there is no possibility to insure oneself against unexpected setbacks. Second,
criminal entrepreneurs run risks as a consequence of the activities of the police and the
law. These risks consist of seizures, arrests and imposed punishment. Even when it is not
the criminal himself who falls ‘victim’ to a criminal investigation, but a relation such as
the foreign drug supplier, this may pose serious problems to the criminal’s own entre-
preneurship. Third, partly because of the lack of regulation, the colleagues of a criminal
entrepreneur, his fellow offenders, constitute an important risk factor. Fellow offenders
may betray the criminal entrepreneur, may steel from him or may not keep to agree-
ments in other ways. A business partner may also prove to be incompetent, such as be-
cause he turns out to be less well connected or have less financial means than he has
made it appear. After all, there is no public quality assessment regarding criminal entre-
preneurs. All in all, many things may go wrong. This is especially true for complex ac-
tivities such as transnational criminal activities, whereby the chain of the criminal
process involves many links. A European who wants to import and trade cocaine, for
example, has to take care, either directly or indirectly, of the following links: its trans-
portation from South America to Europe; its importation into Europe; its initial trans-
portation and storage here; its further processing (adulteration); and its delivery at the
next buyer’s. All these links harbour risks: the cocaine may not arrive (properly); it may
‘disappear’ during its importation or further transportation; it may get adulterated with
the wrong substances or in the wrong proportion; or it may turn out that, in the end,
there is no buyer. In addition, when something goes wrong, it is often unclear whether
this is the result of ill intentions, incompetence or a misunderstanding—have the drugs
indeed been seized through unsuspected police attention, or has the driver simply sto-
len the consignment, or has he got caught because of his stupid, amateurish behaviour?
All in all, criminals have reason enough to distrust one another.
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Because of these risks, criminal entrepreneurship is surrounded by great insecurity
and unpredictability, and so are the undercover operations that target criminal entre-
preneurs. As mentioned above, the unpredictability especially holds for undercover
buys. Of the 34 undercover operations started in 2004, 15 focused (among other things)
on bringing about one or more undercover buys. Of these 15 operations, ten did not
work out according to plan. We present a taxonomy of undercover buys that passed off
differently from expected:
 Either an undercover buy does not take place at all because:
s the suspect in the end turned out to be unable to deliver, as happened in a case in which a con-
crete deal had been struck with the suspect, but on the day the actual buy should have taken
place, the suspect turned out to be unable to supply the drugs;
s the suspect in the end turned out to be unwilling to deliver, as in a case in which the subject
initially seemed willing to do business, but in the end was too suspicious to go through with it;
s the suspect repeatedly did not show up at arranged meetings;
s the goods were found to be sold to another buyer;
s the circumstances indicated that the suspect may have intended to close a rip deal instead of
a deal, which means that the suspect did not actually intend to sell anything to the undercover
agent, but intended to rob him.
 Or the undercover buy does take place, but:
the size of the undercover buy is smaller than originally expected because the subject is unable
to live up to his promises—‘I can deliver a whole container, no problem’.
The fact that undercover buys often do not work out ‘as planned’ does not automatically
mean that an undercover operation has failed entirely and has not contributed in any
way to the investigation and/or trial. Of course, an undercover buy that does take place
but not quite as expected can still generate evidence. Even an undercover buy that never
actually takes place may nevertheless yield proof.12 In general, however, unexpected
developments do have a negative influence on undercover operations: they cause oper-
ations to last longer or to lack intended results. Because of the great frequency with
which commitments are not kept, trade qualifications turn out to be false or undercover
buys do not meet the expectations in other ways, it certainly is not easy to ‘do business’
with criminals efficiently.
Undercover Operations and the Court
In addition to the contributions made by undercover operations to investigations and
trials, the ‘legal tenability’ of this investigative instrument might also be understood as
12In one case, for instance, a suspect has been convicted for preparing a drug delivery to an undercover agent, even though in the
end, the delivery fell through because of logistic problems on the suspect’s side.
KRUISBERGEN ET AL.
406
being a part of the ‘results’. During criminal trials, how do judges respond to the plea
put forward by the defence regarding undercover operations?
To answer this question, we have examined Dutch jurisprudence. In total, we have
studied more than 60 court decisions in cases involving an undercover operation.
The two most important grounds of defence that lawyers have put up in these cases
related to alleged entrapment (argued in 30 cases) and incompatibility with the prin-
ciples of proportionality and subsidiarity (argued in 17 cases).13 The vast majority of
pleas on these and other grounds have been dismissed by the judges. Transparency
is of great importance in this context, namely the extent to which the police and
the Public Prosecution Service provide information on the considerations that were de-
cisive in the use of an undercover operation, the circumstances under which the oper-
ation has been carried out and the findings the operation has yielded.
When this transparency is present, the pleas put forward by the defence are not often
judged to be valid. In the small number of cases in which a plea has been accepted, the
reason has often been the inadequate reporting of and poor insight given into the un-
dercover operation and consequently the judge’s inability to verify the operation’s le-
gitimacy. In the great majority of the cases that we have studied, the judge’s opinion was
that he had been presented with a good picture of the way in which the undercover
operation had been carried out. In the same vein, earlier research has shown that Dutch
judges are of the opinion that they have gained more insight into the application of the
special powers of criminal investigation since the introduction of the BOB Act (Beijer
et al. 2004: 282). This Act prescribes that the use of investigative instruments in a criminal
case must be transparent and verifiable. Before the introduction of this act, judges often
were not even informed about the simple fact that an undercover operation had been
part of a particular criminal investigation (Van Traa 1997: 16).
Discussion
In this article, we have given an account of empirical research into undercover opera-
tions. We havemade use of two data sources: (1) a unique insight into the execution and
results of all undercover operations carried out in the Netherlands in 2004; and (2) the
available Dutch jurisprudence regarding undercover operations. We will briefly summa-
rize our most important findings. First, it has become clear how scarcely undercover
operations are carried out in the Netherlands: 34 times in 2004. Thus, these operations
represent a method of investigation that is not often applied. This may be caused by the
fact that in the Netherlands, contrary to the United States (Ross 2007: 512–13, 562–3),
especially the more controversial forms of undercover operation can only be used when
other investigative instruments have failed, although legislation does not explicitly pre-
scribe that undercover operations in general are only to be used as a last resort. It may be
possible, of course, that there is simply no need for a more frequent use of undercover
operations. Interviews with police and judicial practitioners have revealed that other
factors play a role as well. One of these factors is the limited knowledge of and expe-
rience with undercover operations at the Public Prosecution Service and in the police
force. Precisely because it is so rarely used, covert police operations are sometimes
13When the court permits such a plea, the court has discretionary power to choose one of the following remedies: mitigation of the
sentence, exclusion of evidence, or dismissal of the case.
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simply overlooked during criminal investigations. In addition, due to the IRTaffair and
its aftermath, some public prosecutors view undercover operations as a very invasive and
drastic method of investigation that is only to be used as a last resort. Finally, some pros-
ecutors fear that by opting for an undercover operation, they will lose control, because
the deployment of this investigative method requires the authorisation of higher eche-
lons within the Public Prosecution Service (and feedback on a regular basis).
Second, we have mapped out how many and what sort of results undercover opera-
tions generate. Of the 34 cases in 2004 in which an undercover operation was used, in
seven cases, the operation provided evidence that has been used in convicting the sus-
pect(s). In four cases, the undercover operation has resulted in exclusion, which means
that the investigation team has grown convinced, based on the information gathered
during the undercover operation, that the suspicion against someone was partly or com-
pletely untrue. In one case, the undercover operation has resulted neither in evidence
nor in inclusion, but ‘only’ in steering information. In total, the undercover operation
instrument has contributed to an investigation and/or trial in 12 cases, while it has failed
to contribute anything in 22 cases.
Third, the course of undercover operations turns out to be very unpredictable. This
unpredictability is worst during operations in which undercover buys play a role, such as
in many investigations into the trading of drugs, weapons or stolen property. Because
undercover agents often pose as fellow criminals in these operations, who are game for
a good deal, they are confronted with the unreliable and unpredictable behaviour com-
mon to the criminal entrepreneurial market.
Fourth, readings of Dutch jurisprudence suggest that transparent reporting on an
undercover operation is of crucial importance for the outcome of the legitimacy test
that is carried out by Dutch judges. When both the Public Prosecution Service and
the police provide sufficient insight into the background, the execution and the results
of an undercover operation, the objections put forward by the defence against the use of
this means are usually dismissed and the operation is judged to be legitimate. According
to the assessment of Dutch judges, the stipulated condition of transparency for criminal
cases has been fulfilled.
Fifth, we have examined several assumptions about covert police investigations that
are inherent in legal and academic discourses, the first being the supposition that un-
dercover agents have the power to completely determine their interactions with the sub-
ject. It is true that undercover operations involve an undercover agent who misleads the
suspect. Yet, the idea that the undercover agent is the one who completely dominates the
course of the operation passes over the fact that in many operations, the undercover
agent himself is subjected to the unpredictability of criminals. Especially during oper-
ations focusing on suspects of the trade in drugs, firearms or stolen goods, the practical
course taken by an operation is to a large extent determined by the unpredictable be-
haviour of the suspect(s).
A second assumption relates to the results of undercover operations. From the aca-
demic literature, it appears that these results are only made up of arrests, convictions
and seizures. This idea is founded on a conception of an investigation as a linear process,
leading from a suspicion to a conviction. Our research shows, however, that undercover
operations may not only lead to the arrest of a suspect, but also to his or her exclusion
from further investigation. Furthermore, an operation may also yield steering
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information. Thus, the reality of criminal investigation is less linear and should prefer-
ably be viewed as a more open process focused on establishing the truth.
A third assumption is at the foundation of the Dutch legislation regarding undercover
operations. It relates to the distinction made by the legislator between three different
undercover powers: systematic intelligence gathering, undercover buys and infiltration.
The legal conditions stipulated for infiltration are stricter than those stipulated for un-
dercover buys, while the conditions for this latter power are stricter than those for sys-
tematic intelligence gathering. The underlying supposition is that systematic
intelligence gathering, that ‘only’ entails the gathering of information, is less invasive
and risky than infiltration, during which an undercover agent actually becomes part of
a criminal organization. In the investigative practice, however, the application of system-
atic intelligence gathering has frequently proven to be more invasive than infiltration.
The reason for this is that in some cases of systematic intelligence gathering, the un-
dercover agent needs to get very close to a suspect, while during infiltration, the contact
more often stays limited to a businesslike level. Infiltration is mainly used to investigate
the drugs and arms trade. An undercover agent tries to infiltrate a group of suspects
trading in those goods. The agent’s assignment most often is to get a clear picture
of the criminal organization and to attain a position within the group that is favourable
for setting up the buy of a substantial batch of drugs or weapons. In order to achieve that,
the suspects have to be convinced that the undercover agent is a capable business part-
ner, namely someone who has something to offer, such as certain facilities that come in
useful in the drug trade or simply a lot of capital to purchase drugs from the suspects. In
order to do business with the undercover agent, the suspects also have to perceive him as
reliable: will he meet his commitments, without cheating on them? Although it will cer-
tainly help if the suspects and undercover agent more or less like each other on a per-
sonal level, the main issues here, namely competence and reliability, relate to a more
‘professional’ level.
Systematic intelligence gathering, on the other hand, is often used to gather infor-
mation about a suspect’s involvement in crimes such as murder. When an undercover
agent is deployed to find out whether a man has killed his wife, for instance, he must try
to build up a totally different relation to the suspect than if he were involved in a drugs
investigation. Often, the undercover agent has to see to it that the suspect trusts him
personally, like a friend, in order to get him to talk. Building a friendly relationship and
then betraying this ‘friendship’ by stating damaging information about this man can be
muchmore psychologically taxing to an undercover agent than playing the role of a drug
dealer in a drugs investigation. In this way, the execution of the type of undercover op-
eration for which the legislator has stipulated the lightest conditions (systematic intel-
ligence gathering) may have more dramatic consequences, for both undercover agent
and suspect, than the execution of the legally most serious undercover operation (in-
filtration). Although this empirical result relates specifically to the Dutch legislation, it
leads to a conclusion of broader relevance: rather detailed regulation and judicial dis-
tinctions may not be attuned to investigative practice.
The fourth assumption provides the foundation of the performance management
that in several Western democracies has been applied to the police force; it is the idea
that performance contracts and management focused on output will stimulate the
achievements of investigation teams. The unpredictability that typifies the course of
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undercover operations, however, relates badly to a type of management that is attached
to predictability and aims for quick and measurable output.
Because of the complexity of the work and the contacts with citizens, police officers
are street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980: 3). Within the police force, this continuously
causes a tension between managerial control on the one hand and the need for flex-
ibility and improvisation motivated by the work’s dynamic on the other. In the case of
undercover operations, this tension is certainly not less severe. The unpredictable
course of undercover operations collides with the increased need for controllability that
goes with managerialism. Furthermore, management guided by output indicators may
produce perverse effects. For the public sector as a whole, it has been described, for
instance, how those executing a policy may get the inclination to work ‘towards an in-
dicator’ (e.g. Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Another example is the occurrence of risk
aversion, namely the inclination to avoid choices that may endanger a ‘good score’. In
criminal investigation, this risk aversion may hamper investigations that are expected to
be lengthy or ‘difficult’, or the course and results of which are hard to predict. If one
wants to furnish output in the short run, it may be wise not to devote the available ca-
pacity to such criminal investigations. This may give rise to a blockade of the use of,
among other things, undercover operations, especially the lengthy operations aimed
at the leading, intangible people within a criminal organization. This may enable some
criminal organizations to keep out of range. The pressure for output draws attention
away from the outcome, namely the reduction of crime (Ross 2007: 520–1; Garland
2002: 119–20; see also Cockcroft and Beattie 2009).
Thus, these four assumptions are not in line with our empirical results. The most im-
portant lesson to be drawn from this is that there is a need for more generally accessible
information on this investigative instrument: how often is this means applied, for which
crimes, in which forms (e.g. undercover buys, befriending operations), and how many
and what sort of results do undercover operations yield? Not only scholars, but also pol-
icy makers, regulatory bodies and even the police themselves do not have this informa-
tion, simply because aggregated information is non-existent. For the verifiability of
undercover operations, however, it is essential to gain empirical insight into the matters
we have mentioned. It would provide scholars with a foundation for critical perspectives
and discussions. Most importantly of all, it would enable regulatory bodies to monitor
the deployment of this method of investigation and, whenever necessary, make well in-
formed decisions regarding legislation and guidelines. Thus, transparency may serve as
an alternative for policy instruments arising from the understandable need to have con-
trol over the police, but that at the same time relate badly to the complex, unpredictable
character of criminal investigations in general and undercover operations in particular.
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